(BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE (2) [continued(4)])[14th April 1987]

[Redbook3:187][19870414:1003d](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE (2) [continued(4)])[14th April 1987]

19870414:1003

[continued]

There can be no doubt that Statement (A)* (if not mendacious nor misunderstood by the hearer) is absolutely true as a statement of what was perceived but there must be some doubt as to whether it tells us anything absolutely true about the objective world beyond its 'face value', i.e. that there was / I had a vision of blue eyes.** I would not seriously suggest that there really were blue eyes where I saw them with an inner sense. Blue eyes are external objects. What I saw was an image or vision of blue eyes, and this is clearly understood when one claims inner perception of an outer phenomenon: it was absolutely true to say that I saw blue eyes, but not to say that blue eyes were there.

*[(A) ' “If I say that as I write I ... see ... blue eyes, with an inner sense: then this will be absolutely true” as a statement of what was perceived.' (See last previous entry.)]

**How does this differ from Direct Outer Knowledge: 'I saw a blue flash in the Sky' (p123 [[Redbook3:122-123][19870405:1057e](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE{1}[continued(5)])[5th April 1987]]) – subjectively true? Because it is claimed that there was a blue flash in the Sky but there may not have been. Here, nothing is claimed which may not have been.

[continues]

[PostedBlogger3004for01052016]