Saturday, 30 April 2016

(BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE (2) [continued(3)])[14th April 1987]

[Redbook3:185-186][19870414:1003c](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE (2) [continued(3)])[14th April 1987]

19870414:1003
[continued]

This* brings me to my second attempt to qualify and extend the concept: if the first was 'Outwards' to the Inner [sic] Circle, this is perhaps 'Inwards' towards the Centre, the Absolute Truth, which is (the) Objective**. This is extra-ordinarily difficult. While I was grappling with it I had a feeling that I ought to begin distinguishing between types of Inner Direct Knowledge: between those that were analogous {to} or based on external perception senses, such as Visions, and those that were only experienced with an Inner Sense, such as Qualities.*** I got tangled up and resisted this, mainly I think through being too tired to distinguish any more. Re-considering, however, I do feel that the distinction is probably valid. In the passage quoted above, I can distinguish between the two types of Inner Direct Knowledge as follows:


General

Analogous to External Sense
Unique to Inner Sense


(e.g. introductory)

(e.g. Visions)
(e.g. Qualities)
(Are there any other?)
(1)
****'(If I say that as I write)




(2)
I


feel the quality of xP's presence

(3)
or

see


(4)



the intense, dynamic innocence of xS

(5)
's

blue eyes


(6)
with an inner sense:....




(7)
(then this will be absolutely true....)'




(8)
(as a statement)





I think (4), the intense dynamic innocence and the identification of xS, are both qualities rather than inner visions, even though they attach themselves to a particular part of the vision (the blue eyes). I suspect that the analogy with external sense of (say) Inner Vision brings with it a similar possibility of objective error, and that this is why the 'ghost at the banquet'# keeps appearing and disappearing: because the perception of quality doesn't carry this possibility. Before discussing this further, let me split the last statement along these lines:

(A) 'If I say that as I write I ... see ... blue eyes, with an inner sense: then this will be absolutely true' as a statement of what was perceived.#*

(B) 'If I say that as I write I feel the quality of xP's presence, or ... the intense, dynamic innocence of xS ... with an inner sense: then this will be absolutely true' as a statement concerning independent (or objective) reality.

*[See last previous entry.]

**[i.e. (the) Objective in the sense opposite to (the) Subjective, not in the sense of the object, goal or purpose. The “(the)”, which was added, is in this respect unhelpful here. <20160229;20160429>]

***{ref.127[[Redbook3:126-127][19870405:1057j](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE{1}[continued(10)])[5th April 1987] final para]}

****{ref.123-4[[Redbook3:123-124][19870405:1057f](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE{1}[continued(6)])[5th April 1987]]}

#[William Shakespeare, 'The Tragedy of Macbeth': Act III, Scene IV.]

#*(A) (cf.p123[[Redbook3:123-124][19870405:1057f](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE{1}[continued(6)])[5th April 1987]]) Without the statement: I see blue eyes with an inner sense. That is what I think I see. It is also what I am really perceiving. What is it? – a vision or image.


[continues]


[PostedBlogger30042016]

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