[Redbook5:178-179][19880619:1707h]{Materialism
and Idealism: The Nature of Mind}[19th
June 1988]
19880619.1707
[continued]
The
Materialist v. Idealist argument re the nature of Mind: if it became
possible to 'hook up' a computer to a living brain in such a way that
not only all conscious but all unconscious operations of the mind
were simultaneously shown in terms both of the biological workings
associated with them and
their meaning (actual or potential) to the individual whose brain it
was* – then the materialist argument might be difficult to refute.
But the flaw in this supposition is the suggestion that the whole
unconscious operation of the mind has
meaning, before it manifests
itself in the conscious mind, which can be decoded, and comprehended
by the individual concerned or anyone else; and if not, if there are
some areas of the operation of the unconscious mind which give rise
to meaning but have no comprehensible meaning themselves, the
question would still be wide open.
Similarly,
if at any stage meaningful mind operation was associated with
meaningless (e.g. random) brain function – just as in the previous
example meaningful mind operation is associated with meaningless
(i.e. incomprehensible) mind operation – the idealist would be able
to counter the materialist's assertion that mind is simply the result
of brain.
----
If
the materialist could in theory link the entire life-thought of an
individual from conception to death logically in terms of both
brain-function and mind-meaning in this way, it would be difficult to
refute the contention that mind-meaning was an 'illusion' produced by
brain-function – difficult to refute it on the materialists' terms.
Many other questions about meaning and experience would still remain
open, of course; and the idealists' view would still not be refuted;
it would, however, seem to be without proof.
*--
and if all the meanings could be accounted for logically in terms of
meaning or biologically and
psychologically
related brain function –
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