{Empirical Knowledge in Science}[27th December 1988]

[Redbook6:72-75)][19881227:1952]{Empirical Knowledge in Science}[27th December 1988]

19881227.1952

‘To a certain extent, the problem of whether a scientific model is nothing but a subjective construct in which the scientist unites his experience is the same as the problem that Kant had in mind. One of the differences, however, is that in Kant’s time science was still rather exclusively theory. Its close connection with praxis (practice, doing) had not yet been discovered. For this reason the Kantian epistemological (or human knowledge) problem could centre on such a question as: What guarantee does the knowing subject have that his “models” of reality reflect reality itself? Inasmuch as, in an exclusively theoretical science, the only contact that one has with reality is afforded by means of one’s knowledge, the problem seems to be insoluble.

‘The development of science from a theoretical to an experimental discipline forces philosophy to view the epistemological problem in a new way. For in an experimental science the investigator is in a twofold contact with reality—namely, by his knowledge and by his experimental praxis. Modern atomic theory is one of the best examples to illustrate this point. It was this theory that was most directly confronted with the problem of the realistic value of its models. It could take up this challenge because of the theory’s effectiveness for experimental praxis, which is the final judge of the realistic value of the theoretical models. It has confirmed the audacious rational speculations of ancient atomism; but at the same time it has revealed that, in order to be really effective, reason is in need of experimental assistance.’*

There are two problems here.

The first is that knowledge seems in this passage to be associated with theory rather than with experimental results. It is not only because both the gift or power of Knowledge and the practice of experiment (empiricism, and implementative skills) are associated with u~ on the circle, that I disagree with this, but also because to my mind knowledge is a matter of fact (whether correct or incorrect) whereas theory is not:** even one’s knowledge of a theory is only knowledge that there is a theory harmonising*** (or attempting to harmonise)*** certain known facts, facts which can only be known by observation (of which experiment is simply a controlled development).

*E[ncylopaedia] B[ritannica] XXV.579[:] Philosophical Schools and Doctrines: Atomism.

**[There is a colon here]

***or organising/ordaining

or organise/ordain

of course.

[continues]

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