{Catastrophe Theory [continued (4)]}[26th September 1988]

[Redbook5:361][19880926:1545d]{Catastrophe Theory [continued (4)]}[26th September 1988]

19880926.1545

[continued]

If, on the third hand,* or the first foot, its purpose is to enable prediction of sequences once the (catastrophe-)category of the sequence is established, then the objection is a little more sophisticated. It is that in the absence (on the first finger)** of a theoretical basis linking the mathematics to the phenomenal sequence,*** and (on the second finger)** of any method of precisely quantifying the phenomenal sequence, every sequence is in principle to be treated as potentially unique: in other words, it cannot be assumed that it will conform to any particular sequence pattern even in outline, until it does.

This is even true of ‘hard’ applications: it is not a lot of use saying that we use it to show how the embryo grows, not how fast or how much; if we already know by other methods how it grows, theory is unnecessary; if we do not, it is unproven in this application. It can be useful in pointing researchers in what may be the right direction, but so can several other theories or patterns of a similar type: notably, those of Deterministic Chaos [sic].

*[Of Professor Thom’s Catastrophe Theory – see last 3 previous entries]

**[Or toe, presumably, if it’s a foot]

***not to be confused with the theoretical basis of the mathematics itself. Of course, arguably no science has a theoretical basis linking the maths with the sequence: that is why precise measurement is so important.

[continues]

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