(BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE{1}[continued])[5th April 1987]

[Redbook3:119-120][19870405:1057b](BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE{1}[continued])[5th April 1987]

19870405.1057

(Sunday)

[continued]

The implication of this* is** that the distinction between knowledge and belief must lie within the state or operation of mind of the knower/believer: at least, I think that is how I understand these terms. This puts upon the third*** party the task of assessing the likelihood of truth of any knowledge, for his own benefit: but if we all did this, we might develop knowledge faster than we do.

Examples cause problems: everyone has met the person who talks a lot about things which he seems to know a lot about, but about which in fact he knows very little. It seems wrong to insist on describing such a man as 'knowledgeable' (the use of which [word] must presumably be consistent with the use of the word 'knowledge'). I think perhaps we can approach this by examining the state or operation of mind which leads to the knowledge – yes, I know that is also part of knowledge, but conceptually it is a relatively straightforward one at least for the knower/believer to grasp (if he tries), and probably ****for the external assessor to elicit from him by question and truthful answer.

I think these points have been drawn in one way or another from the review – although I didn't realise it at the time. I wrote on the T[imes] L[iterary] S[upplement] page: 'The distinction of Knowledge from Belief cannot depend on its truth, since ultimately we cannot be certain of the truth of any of our knowledge: our meaning of “knowledge” is defined subjectively (i.e. by {the} “proof” being used), not objectively (i.e. by its truth).'

*[See last previous entry.]

**Is it? Yes, I guess so. <930418>

***[= other?]

****?

[continues]

[PostedBlogger12022016]