{Soviet Foreign Policy}[7th April 1991]

[Redbook9:45-46][19910407:1231h]{Soviet Foreign Policy}[7th April 1991]

19910407.1231 (Sun[day])

[continued]

‘MacGuire* concedes that [President] Reagan’s confrontational stance spurred the Soviets towards a sweeping reassessment of their foreign policy in 1983 and 1984.** However, he contends that the initial impact was to make them genuinely fear a real war and to become more aggressive, especially in the Third World.

‘One is inclined to accept much of MacGuire’s account of the 1983-84** period. Indeed, it is worth remembering that as late as 1985 Gorbachev increased military aid to Third World clients and escalated the war in Afghanistan in an effort to win it. It is difficult, though, to explain his later change of policy. Why did he move from a policy of intensified foreign interventionism to one of unprecedented “glasnost” and major foreign policy concessions, even in regional disputes? MacGuire attributes the change to an “act of faith”*** on the part of Gorbachev. A simpler and more plausible explanation might lie with the Stinger**** missiles and the Strategic Defense Initiative.#

#*

*[Spelling unclear in ms, throughout – looks like MccGuire, could be MaGuire or MacGuire]

**64C1984

***

			1984
			C
		/↑/	/↓/	\↓\
	/↑/	/↓/			\↓\
1976	R~	r~	[1992]			S~	1992

****supplied by the U[nited] S[tates] to anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

#[‘Star Wars’]

#*[(Times Literary Supplement 4589, 19910315:6, ‘Soviet Military Paradoxes: Has the Kremlin really become more defensive-minded?’ P. Glynn, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, & author of ‘Closing Pandora’s Box: A History of Arms Control.’ ]

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