{Fear and Ambition, War and Peace}[21st May 1972]

[Redbook1:243][19720521:1103b]{Fear and Ambition, War and Peace}[21st May 1972]

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            Perhaps one can divide wars into those occasioned by immediate Fear, and those based on Ambition (whose final cause may or may not be national insecurity).  In the latter category one might place the North Vietnamese in the present conflict, and in the former perhaps the United States.  Clearly every simple doctrine has its dangers but as a general guide to the motivation of national leaders this one has its advantages if used carefully.

            Clearly it becomes vital for the Statesman seeking peace -- who must find himself in most cases in the former category -- to decide into which class the leaders of the opposing nation fall.  If fear for national security is their prime consideration, much may be accomplished by the Statesman with emotional speeches on the brotherhood of man, the impossibility of his ever declaring War, and so forth -- without actually giving anything valuable away except a spirit of confidence.  If imperial ambition moves the enemy, stern warnings of military preparedness in a purely defensive spirit may act as a brake on his designs.

            It is noticeable that American statesman at present use neither (or both) of these approaches, since no one can quite fathom the Russian attitude: fear or imperial ambition, or both?  It is hard to reconcile the SALT talks with Czechoslovakia in 1968.

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